Breaking Up Doesn\u27t Have to Be So Hard: Default Rules for Partition and Secession by Richardson, Nathan
Chicago Journal of International Law 
Volume 9 Number 2 Article 11 
1-1-2009 
Breaking Up Doesn't Have to Be So Hard: Default Rules for 
Partition and Secession 
Nathan Richardson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richardson, Nathan (2009) "Breaking Up Doesn't Have to Be So Hard: Default Rules for Partition and 
Secession," Chicago Journal of International Law: Vol. 9: No. 2, Article 11. 
Available at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol9/iss2/11 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Chicago Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please 
contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu. 
Breaking Up Doesn't Have to Be So Hard:
Default Rules for Partition and Secession
Nathan Richardson*
I. INTRODUCTION
The creation of smaller new states by partition or secession from larger ones
is among the most notable trends in the postwar international system. This trend
has often been peaceful-as in the former Czechoslovakia-but conflict and
discord seem to be the norm, with the breakup of and resulting war in the
former Yugoslavia as perhaps the most tragic example. To the extent that the
purpose of international law is, among other things, to promote peaceful
relations and mutually beneficial agreements between international actors, it has
largely failed to achieve this goal in cases where new states are created. This is
not entirely surprising; partition and secession are at root political issues, and are
particularly likely to inflame nationalist sentiments. The trend toward dissolution
and devolution has probably also developed more quickly than law can adapt.
Although international law cannot provide a complete solution to these
problems, it can play a greater role.
International law would be more influential and beneficial in the process of
new-state creation if it were implemented in a form similar to that of default
rules in private contract law. In many ways, parties considering creation of a new
state are in a similar position to that of private actors negotiating a contract.
They seek agreement, if possible, on a wide range of substantive and procedural
issues, lack the information and ability to plan for every contingency, and want
to avoid a costly breakdown in talks. There are important differences, of
course-above all, that breakdown often results in armed conflict in the
international context-but the analogy is useful. Private actors have the benefit
of an extensive background of contract law that provides a framework for their
negotiations. It is usually possible to contract around these background
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principles, or default rules, but their presence provides a starting point for
negotiations, reduces the costs of those negotiations, and ultimately helps
prevent negotiation breakdown.
To some extent, the default-rules idea will be familiar to scholars of
international law since rules of customary international law operate in a
somewhat similar way-though there are important differences between the
rules proposed in this Comment and traditional customary-law rules. However,
neither customary international law nor treaty law provides many rules of any
kind for the creation of new states. In this area, international law currently
provides a mix of general principles of uncertain practical meaning (such as the
right of all "peoples" to "self-determination")' and specific substantive rules in
narrow areas which, in most cases, have yet to be generally adopted.
This Comment argues that default rules are the best way for international
law to provide a politically acceptable framework for the creation of new states,
thereby reducing the likelihood of negotiation breakdown and conflict. The
Comment further argues that states should adopt these default rules by treaty,
though in a form that differs significantly from that used in the largely
ineffective treaties that currently govern state-succession issues.
A. FRAMEWORK
Section II of this Comment describes the general trend toward the creation
of new states and the role international law plays in such cases. It then outlines
the current state and limitations of international law relevant to the creation of
new states in more detail. Section Ill briefly discusses the literature of default
rules, identifying their advantages and limitations. Section IV presents default
rules as a practical remedy for the problems identified in Section II. It begins by
arguing that implementation by treaty is the most likely method to succeed, and
moves on to discuss what the content of default rules for the creation of new
states should be in three substantive areas. It then describes possible criticisms
of default rules in the international context, and raises likely responses to those
criticisms. The Comment concludes in Section V by summarizing the key
advantages of default rules: potential to reduce conflict, low cost of
implementation, and political palatability.
See Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, General
Assembly Res No 1514, UN Doc A/RES/1514 (1960); United Nations International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (1966), Art 1(1), 999 UN Treaty Ser 171 (1976).
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B. DEFINITIONS
The term "default rule" is applied in a wide variety of contexts to refer to
concepts that, though they share underlying similarities, have substantial
practical differences. It is important to be as clear as possible about the way this
Comment uses this and related terms.
Three different forms of rules are defined in this section and used in the
remainder of this Comment: "immutable" rules, "semi-immutable" rules, and, as
the term is used in this Comment, default rules themselves.
1. "Immutable" Rules
Immutable rules are rules which cannot be changed by any party, even by
mutual agreement. The obligation of good-faith performance imposed by the
Uniform Commercial Code is such a rule-a provision in a contract for goods
purporting to discard the obligation is effectively invalid.2
2. "Semi-immutable" Rules
As defined in this Comment, "semi-immutable" rules are those that parties
can contract around in an agreement, but which apply even in the absence of any
agreement. Such rules are often called default rules elsewhere. For example,
some scholars have recently suggested that the rule for organ-donor status be
changed from opt-in to opt-out.3 This rule (in either form) applies to all parties
regardless of whether they have made any agreement-even though the rule can
ultimately be shifted by such agreement.
3. Default Rules
The term "default rules" in this Comment refers exclusively to rules that
function narrowly by filling gaps in incomplete agreements. These rules have no
legal role when there is no agreement, since there are no gaps to fill. Such rules
encourage negotiation and agreement not by simply giving an opportunity to opt
out or in, but by providing a starting point for negotiations, reducing the costs
of negotiation, and reducing the risks of breakdown over complex issues. The
simple fact that their benefits are available only if the parties reach a basic
agreement further encourages negotiation. Many of the familiar rules of
contractual interpretation would fall into this category, but default rules need not
be an attempt to reconstruct the intent of the parties; they can in principle
operate contrary to that likely intent as so-called "penalty" default rules, or even
2 See UCC § 1-203 (ALI 2007).
See Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler, Nudge: Improving Deisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness
175-82 (Yale 2008).
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cover issues which the parties did not manifest an intent to resolve. As the next
section illustrates, these "true default" rules are wholly absent from the
international law governing the creation of new states.
II. THE PROBLEM: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CREATION
OF NEW STATES
A. THE TREND TOWARD PARTITION, SECESSION,
DISSOLUTION, AND DEVOLUTION
Since World War II, and particularly since the end of the Cold War, there
has been a dramatic increase in the number of states in the international system.4
As one writer has stated, this trend is "one of the major political developments
of the twentieth century" and at the same time has been "one of the more
important sources of international conflict."5 This increase has been driven by
secession of new states from their former parent states, often their colonial
masters, and by partition or dissolution of existing states into two or more new
states. Even when new states are not created, these pressures often lead to
devolution of power to more local authority.6 In short, the world is much more
decentralized now than it has been for some time.
The creation of new states has often resulted in conflict. Bangladesh,7 East
Timor,8 Eritrea,9 Biafra' Chechnya," and the constituent parts of the former
Yugoslavia 2 have all either seceded, or attempted to do so, amid violence-and
these are but a few of the many examples.' 3 To be sure, some new states have
entered into existence peacefully. The USSR dissolved into its constituent
4 See James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law 4 (Oxford 2d ed 2006).
5 Id.
6 Devolution of power to Scotland in the UK is perhaps the best example of this phenomenon. See
generally Colin B. Picker, 'A Light Unto the Nations" The New British Federalism, the Scottish
Parliament, and Constitutional Lessons for Multiethnic States, 77 Tulane L Rev 1 (2002).
7 See Joshua Castelino, International Law and Self-Determination 147-72 (Martinus Nijhoff 2000);
Crawford, The Creation of States at 393 (cited in note 4).
8 See Crawford, The Creation of States at 560-62 (cited in note 4).
9 See Castellino, International Law at 70-71 (cited in note 7); Crawford, The Creation of States at 402
(cited in note 4).
10 See Castellino, International Law at 68-69 (cited in note 7); Crawford, The Creation of States at 406
(cited in note 4).
11 See Crawford, The Creation of States at 408-10 (cited in note 4).
12 See id at 395-401. See generally John Williams, Legiimagy in International Relations and the Rse and
Fall of Yugoslavia (St. Martin's 1998).
13 See Crawford, The Creation of States at 391-418 (cited in note 4) (comprehensively listing both
successful and unsuccessful partition movements since 1945).
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republics bloodlessly, 14 and Czechoslovakia remains the best example of how to
conduct a peaceful partition.'" The trend toward decentralization continues
today. Quebec, 6 Iraq,17 Kosovo," and even Belgium' 9 are current or possible
near-future cases of secession or partition, with varying degrees of likelihood
and potential for conflict.
Scholars have proposed various reasons for this flowering of new states and
distributed authority. The most likely explanation is that relative peace and
economic changes associated with globalization have made membership in a
large state less attractive or necessary.2 ° Whatever the cause, the effects of this
process have been dramatic. Samuel Huntington has argued that the trend is part
of a fundamental change in the structure of the international system.2'
Consideration of such sweeping changes is beyond the scope of this Comment;
instead, it focuses on dealing with the effects of the trend within the current
international system.
B. INTERNATIONAL LAW (SOMETIMES) MATTERS IN THE
CREATION OF NEW STATES
Given this mixed experience, what can the international community do to
make it more likely that the process of new-state creation will be peaceful? Some
such events, particularly secessions from powerful centralized states, may be
doomed to failure, violence, or both. Others, as the Czechoslovakian event likely
illustrates, will probably succeed peacefully no matter what the background
international law is. This Comment is largely concerned with cases between
14 See id at 395, 416.
15 See id at 402, 416.
16 See id at 411-12.
17 See, for example, Sarah Baxter, America Ponders Cutting Iraq in Three, Sunday Times (London) 26
(Oct 8, 2006); Leslie H. Gelb, The Three-State Solution, NY Times A27 (Nov 25, 2003). See also
Andrew George, We Had to Destroy the County to Save It: On the Use of Partition to Restore Public Order
During Occupation, 48 Va J Intl L 187, 187 n 1 (citing to a list of sources stating the possibility of
partition of Iraq).
is See Crawford, The Creation of States at 407-408 (cited in note 4). See also Dan Bilefsky, In a
Showdown, Kosovo Declares its Independence, NY Times A6 (Feb 18, 2008).
19 See Elizabeth Bryant, Divisions Could Lead to a Partition in Belium, San Fran Chron A14 (Oct 12,
2007).
20 See Michael J. Kelly, Political Downsiing: The Re-Emergence of Sef-Determinalion, and the Movement
Toward Smaller, Ethnically Homogenous States, 47 Drake L Rev 209, 227, 266 (1999).
21 See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of CiviliZations and the Remaking of World Order 35 (Simon &
Schuster 1996) (noting that the decentralizing trend threatens the end of the Westphalian "nation-
states-as-billiard-balls" model of international relations, with it being replaced by a "multi-layered
international order more closely resembling that of medieval times").
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these extremes: secession events that are opposed but not crushed, complex
partitions, and similar cases in which agreement on the terms of the creation of
new states is possible but difficult.
In these cases legal rules can make a difference, since the marginal benefit of
rules with a different form or substance may be enough to make agreement on
the terms of new-state creation possible when it previously was not, or to make
negotiation attractive where it may have seemed pointless. To illustrate this
point, consider two recent cases, Kosovo and Iraq, where observers or the
parties themselves have contemplated the creation of a new state. In each case,
international law rules are likely to make a difference.
First, rules of international law governing the territory of new states likely
played a role in the failure of Kosovo to reach agreement with Serbia on the
terms of its secession. Kosovo recently seceded from Serbia after a period under
UN administration.22 It appears as if the international community will accept this
secession-several countries, including the US and many EU members, have
recognized Kosovar independence.23  Serbia opposed the secession and
continues to claim it was invalid.24 Conflict remains a serious possibility.
2a
Agreement between Serbia and Kosovo on the terms of secession, if possible,
would certainly be preferable to the current state of affairs (as would agreement
by both sides that Kosovo would not formally secede). Such an agreement would
reduce the risk of conflict and increase stability. A major issue in the Kosovar
independence dispute is the status of majority-Serb territory within Kosovo.26
Here, the legal rule matters. The customary rule of uti possideti 27 governs the
territorial boundaries of Kosovo-even in the absence of any agreement. If the
form or substance of this rule were different, it is certainly possible that either or
both sides would see greater advantages to negotiating, and, possibly, reaching a
peaceful agreement.
22 See Bilefsky, Kosovo Declares Its Independence, NY Times A6 (cited in note 18).
23 See Catherine Philp, West Welcomes a New Neighbour as Angy Serbs Look East for Help, The Times
(London) 30 (Feb 19, 2008). See also David Charter, Neighbours Anger Serbia by Backing Kosovo
Independence, The Times (London) 47 (Mar 20, 2008).
24 See Bilefsky, Kosovo Declares Its Independence, NY Times A6 (cited in note 18) (noting that Serbian
Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica has called Kosovo a "false state").
25 See Humphrey Hawksley, Kosovo's Independence Could Mean a New Conflict, YaleGlobal Online (Nov
5, 2007), available online at <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.artide?id=9934> (visited Dec 5,
2008).
26 See Dan Bilefsky, Serbia Proposes Division of Kosovo: Prislina Calls Plan a 'Provocalion,' Intl Herald Trib
3 (Mar 25, 2008). See also OSCE Mission in Kosovo and United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, Tenth Assessment of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo (2003), available online at
<http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2003/03/903_en.pdf> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
27 Utipossidetis is discussed in detail in Section II.C.3.b below.
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Second, rules of international law governing the succession of state property
would be critical to any partition of Iraq. Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the US
has considered proposals to partition that country into three or more new
states.28 Given the level of violence in the country, distrust between Shiites,
Sunnis, and Kurds, and other factors, a negotiated agreement between all three
factions (and the US as occupying power) would be greatly preferable to an
imposed partition. 9
Here too, the background legal rules play an important role in making the
necessary negotiations for such an agreement more or less likely to occur or to
succeed. A critical issue in any such partition would be the division of Iraqi oil
resources. A treaty purports to create rules for the division of such property, but
has not entered into force.3 ° Again, the form and substance of the rule for
division of this property (among many other rules) will have a powerful impact
on whether parties see negotiations as valuable, and on the likelihood of success
of any negotiations. In both of these cases, and many others that are likely to
arise in the future, default rules for the interpretation of agreements can provide
the legal framework for such negotiations.
C. EXISTING INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
NEW-STATE CREATION
International law governs, at least purportedly and at the margins, most
activities by states that affect other states or the international community.
Despite the general trend toward the creation of new states through secession
and partition, these events are relatively unregulated by international law. In fact,
the traditional view on the creation of new states is that it is a political issue into
which international law cannot or should not intrude.3 This limitation vividly
illustrates the principle that, as one scholar has'put it, "the fact that some
development is of importance in international relations does not entail that it is
regulated by international law."32 There is, of course, a very large body of
academic literature on the international law concerning the creation of new
states. Almost all of it, however, focuses on the question of when and whether
28 See George, 48 Va J Intl L at 187 n 1 (cited in note 17) (citing to a list of sources stating the
possibility of partition of Iraq).
29 See generally id.
30 See Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts
(1983), 22 ILM 306 (1983) (discussed below in detail in Section II.C.2).
31 See Antonello Tancredi, A Normative Due Process' in the Creation of States Through Secession, in
Marcelo G. Kohen, ed, Secession: International Law Perspectives 171, 171-72 (Cambridge 2006). See
also Crawford, The Creation of States at 4 (cited in note 4).
32 Crawford, The Creation of States at 4 (cited in note 4).
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there is a right to secession or other means of the creation of new states-not
how such an event, whether enabled by a legal right or not, might take place.
33
The rights debate is beyond the scope of this Comment-this section deals only
with the international law governing how and under what terms secession or
partition can take place. Further, this section by necessity discusses the
international law (whether in force or not) that does exist in the context of new-
state creation. This should not be interpreted as refuting the general argument
that little effective law exists in this context.
1. An Exception to the Legal Vacuum-Immutable Rules of
State Succession
Against this backdrop of few legal norms, there are limited substantive
exceptions. A few agreements purporting to create substantive rules for creating
new states exist in varying stages of implementation. These agreements
frequently take the form of immutable rules.
The best example of such rules in international treaty law is the 1978 Vienna
Convention on State Succession in Respect of Treaties ("Treaty Convention"),
which governs issues of treaty succession.34 Only twenty-one states are parties to
the Treaty Convention.3" This number is sufficient to bring the treaty into force,
but it is hardly a ringing endorsement of its principles. The Treaty Convention
provides a variety of general rules, such as that in Article 11 providing that
succession "does not as such affect" boundary treaties. 36 The most relevant
provision in the context of secession and partition is Article 34, stating that
successor states are presumptively bound by treaties to which their parent or
predecessor state was a party.37 Whenever the Treaty Convention does apply, its
rules are immutable. Even if parties agree to the creation of a new state and wish
to make alternative allocations of treaty rights and responsibilities, the Treaty
Convention at least purports to prevent them from doing so. There may be
good reasons for making some rules for treaty succession immutable, but this
need not be the case with respect to all classes of treaties.38
33 See generally, for example, Robert McCorquodale, ed, Self-Determinaion in International Law
(Dartmouth 2000); Margaret Moore, ed, National Self-Determinaion and Secession (Oxford 1998); Lee
C. Buchheit, Secession: The Legiimaqy of Self-Determination (Yale 1978).
34 Vienna Convention on State Succession in Respect of Treaties (1978), 17 ILM 1488 (1978).
35 Vienna Convention on State Succession in Respect of Treaties (1978), Multilateral Treaties
Deposited with the Secretary General, available online at <http://treaties.un.org/Pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=468&chapter=23&lang=en> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
36 Vienna Convention on State Succession in Respect of Treaties, art 11.
37 Id, art 34.
38 The advantages of various forms of rules in the treaty succession context are discussed in more
detail in Section IV.C.I.c below.
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Another set of immutable rules would be created by proposed agreements
on state succession with respect to issues of nationality. Such agreements have
been drafted, but have not yet come into force. For example, the International
Law Commission in 1999 adopted Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural
Persons in Relation to the Succession of States ("Draft Articles").39 These largely
focus on imposing standards and obligations on succeeding states in order to
prevent the creation of stateless persons.4 ° Like the Treaty Convention, the
Draft Articles create immutable rules.4' This is understandable to the extent that
the human rights of individuals and burdens of statelessness on other states are
implicated. Nevertheless, there is significant room for negotiation on these
issues that the Draft Articles would either block or permit only due to their
vagueness and generality. Furthermore, since the Draft Articles are not yet
codified into a treaty, much less one that has entered into force, they have little
relevance to the creation of new states in the near future.
2. The Property Convention and Semi-Immutable Rules
Not all agreements related to the creation of new states are made up of
immutable rules; some allow room for parties to contract around their terms by
casting them as semi-immutable rules. One example is the 1983 Vienna
Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives, and
Debts ("Property Convention"), which provides a rough set of rules for
succession of debts and property. Like the Treaty Convention, only a relatively
small number of states (seven) have ratified the Property Convention. 42 As a
result, it is not yet in force.4" Alone among international law instruments
governing state succession, the Property Convention explicitly provides for
deviation from its mandates by agreement between the states in question."
Article 14, in fact, states that succession of property should generally be based
39 See Report of the International Law Commission: Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to
the Succession of States (1999), available online at <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/
instruments/english/draft%20articles/3_41 999.pdf> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
40 See Andreas Zimmermann, Secession and the Law of State Succession, in Kohen, ed, Secession 208, 228
(cited in note 31).
41 See Report of the International Law Commission, art 14(1) (cited in note 39) (stating that "[t]he
status of persons concerned as habitual residents shall not be affected by the succession of
States'.
42 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts
(1983), Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General, available online at
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=282&chapter=3&lang=en>
(visited Dec 5, 2008).
43 See Zimmermann, Secession and the Law of State Succession at 221 (cited in note 40).
44 See Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts,
arts 14-15.
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on agreement-perhaps the most emphatic existing endorsement of a contract
model of new-state creation.4" Article 17 goes on to provide a limited set of rules
in succession cases.46 Many of the provisions in the Property Convention are
vague standards, rather than rules-for example, property that does not fall into
the set categories in Article 17 described above is divided in "equitable
proportion. '4 The Property Convention makes frequent reference to this
"equitable proportion" standard,48 but gives little guidance as to how equitable
proportions should be determined, or who should determine them.
In one critical respect, the Property Convention would operate in a gap-
filling manner similar to that of default rules in private contract law. Parties
could interpret agreements that create new states but do not include terms for
the division of property using the Property Convention rules as gap-fillers. The
Property Convention, if it entered into effect, would also govern the allocation
of debts and property between states that had not agreed to split. In the private-
contract context, contractual default rules do not bind parties who have failed to
reach an agreement (and therefore have not created a contractual relationship).
The purpose of such rules is to aid in construction and interpretation of
contracts, not to govern the relations of strangers. In the absence of a basic
agreement, therefore, the Property Convention functions exactly like the
immutable rules in the Treaty Convention. In this sense, the rules in the
Property Convention are "semi-immutable."49
3. Customary International Law of New-State Creation
In light of the limited degree to which treaties provide international law
relevant in cases of partition or secession, parties in such cases may look to
customary international law for guidance. Customary law is helpful to some
extent, but does not provide a general framework for cases of new-state
creation. The rules of customary law that do exist function either as immutable
or semi-immutable rules.
a) The law of state succession to international organizations-an immutable rule.
One example of a customary norm applying to new states is that successor
states, including those arising from partition or secession, must (re)apply for
membership in international organizations, unless they can claim to "continue
the international legal personality of said State."5° Much like the immutable
45 Id, art 14.
46 Id, art 17.
47 Id.
48 See id, arts 17(1)(c), 18(1)(b), 18(1)(d), 31(2), 37(2), 40(1), 42.
49 Semi-immutable rules are defined in more detail in Section I.B.2 above.
50 Zimmermann, Secession and the Law of State Succession at 220 (cited in note 40).
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provisions of the Treaty Convention, this rule offers no room for negotiating an
alternative arrangement, but lacks the benefit of settled, clear rules offered by
codification in a treaty.
b) Uti possidetis-the customary law of territog. Perhaps the most significant
customary legal principle in cases of partition or secession is that of utipossidetis,
which generally indicates that new states must be created according to previous
boundaries."1 In cases of partition or secession, these boundaries are the internal
administrative boundaries of the predecessor state. The ICJ has held that uti
possidelis is not limited to cases of decolonization or any other specific scenario:
Nevertheless the principle is not a special rule which pertains solely to one
specific system of international law. It is a general principle, which is logically
connected with the phenomenon of the obtaining of independence, wherever it
occurs. Its obvious purpose is to prevent the independence and stability of new
States being endangered by fratricidal struggles provoked by the challenging of
frontiers following the withdrawal of the administering power.
52
U/i possidelis may therefore operate as a restrictive principle that forbids
renegotiation of borders during the creation of new states. The principle
generally blocked such realignment during the decolonization of Latin America
and Africa.53
The principle may not be an absolute, immutable rule, however. It does not
fix borders for eternity-states clearly can and do negotiate new borders by
treaty. The rule might be interpreted in a narrow form, preventing only forceful
alteration of pre-existing borders while allowing parties that so choose to
negotiate other borders.54 If this interpretation is correct, utipossidetis operates as
a gap-filling rule that parties can contract around. This interpretation was
endorsed by the Badinter Commission considering the breakup of Yugoslavia in
its Opinion #2, which stated that "whatever the circumstances, the right to self-
determination must not involve changes to existing frontiers at the time of
independence ... except where the States concerned agree otherwise."5  This
interpretation of uti possideis, stripped from its decolonization context, is
probably the most relevant for future cases of partition or secession.
Even if it can be contracted around, the u/ipossidetis principle operates as a
semi-immutable rule, much like those in the Property Convention. If parties so
agree, they can set new international borders that vary from pre-existing, internal
51 See Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v Mali), 1986 ICJ Lexis 3, 23 (Dec 22, 1986).
52 Id at 24.
53 See Castellino, InternalionalLaw at 112-13 (cited in note 7).
54 See Tancredi, A Normiative Due Process' at 192 (cited in note 31).
55 Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on Questions Arising from the
Dissolution of Yugoslavia (1992), 31 ILM 1488, 1498 (1992) (emphasis added).
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ones. In the absence of agreement, however, uti possidetis still governs their
relationship-borders will be set under international law according to the
principle. There are substantial advantages to this approach, of course. Chief
among them is a balance between stability and administrability of the rule on the
one hand, and the right to peaceful renegotiation of borders on the other.
However, these conflicting interpretations of the principle may raise serious
doubts among parties negotiating partition or secession about how international
bodies (perhaps the ICJ) will interpret agreements to deviate from existing
borders in future disputes. In fact, some scholars have argued that the Badinter
Commission misinterpreted the ICJ's position in Burkina Faso v Mali, 6 and
further that ulipossidetis has no application outside of the decolonization context
at all.57 Even if the Badinter Commission's ruling in Opinion #2 is an accurate
statement of the law, it is applicable only to Europe.58 In short, the implications
of ulipossidetis for new-state creation remain unclear; depending on how various
precedents are interpreted, the rule could have different effects. This uncertainty
alone is a significant barrier to negotiation of border issues when new states are
created.
Whether the customary rule is immutable or semi-immutable, in practice the
internal administrative boundaries of colonial powers provide a basis for the
current boundaries of most existing states.5 9 The breakup of both the USSR and
Yugoslavia has occurred along the lines of previous internal boundaries, though
this does not necessarily mean that the newly created states would not have
agreed on other borders had they been able to do so. Preexisting borders may
have been broadly acceptable in the case of the USSR, and while they clearly
were not in the case of Yugoslavia,6 ° the resulting war was in part a result of an
inability to agree on borders (to vastly oversimplify the causes of the conflict),
not an immutable interpretation of ufi possidetis that would forbid any such
agreement.
c) Customay international law as semi-immutable rules. Much of customary
international law in fact operates as semi-immutable rules-the form should be
familiar to scholars of international law. Once a rule of customary law has been
56 See note 51 and accompanying text.
57 See Peter Radan, Post-Secession International Borders: A Critical Anaysis of the Opinions of the Badinter
Arbitration Commission, 24 Melb U L Rev 50, 61-62 (2000).
58 Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission at 1498 (cited in note 55).
59 See Castellino, International Law at 109 (cited in note 7) (stating that uti possidetis is the "biggest
contributor" to the definition of borders of 80 percent of current states).
60 Compare Crawford, The Creation of States at 395 (cited in note 4) (discussing the relatively smooth
dissolution of the USSR), with id at 395-401 (discussing conflict associated with the dissolution
of Yugoslavia).
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created by state practice and opinio juris, it governs the relationship between
states except in cases where states agree otherwise." Where states make an
incomplete agreement, customary law in the relevant area can fill gaps by
providing an independent source of law-as discussed above, utipossidetis may
play this role when agreements to create new states leave territorial issues
undecided. But where states make no agreement at all, they continue to be
bound by customary-law rules (unless one of the states has objected to the
rule).62 The exceptions, of course, are jus cogens norms, which operate as
immutable rules-states cannot legally agree to violate them.63
4. The State of the Law of Partition and Secession
As the preceding discussion shows, parties involved in the creation of new
states, whether they are existing states, secessionist groups, or occupying powers
considering partition, have little guidance from international law. There is
virtually no law on the procedure of new-state creation by secession or partition,
other than the general ban on the use of force in the UN Charter.64 Some
substantive law does exist, with the details of state succession with respect to
treaties fixed in many respects by the Treaty Convention, and territorial
boundary issues in part resolved by the customary principle of utipossidetis. There
is some prospect of further development of law if the Property Convention and
Draft Articles enter into force, but there is little evidence that this is likely.
In a sense, there is both too little and too much law in this area. For many
issues, there is either no proposed law at all or no law that has entered into
effect. For others, such as treaty succession and, possibly, borders, international
law implements a single solution from which deviation is difficult or impossible.
This may benefit some states by settling expectations and minimizing the
externality impact of shifts in treaty commitments or borders, but at the cost of
making secession or partition negotiations more difficult than they would
otherwise be and thereby increasing the risk of negotiation breakdown and
conflict.
61 Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102(2), § 102 cmt c (1987).
62 See International Law Association, Statement of Prinatles Appcable to the Formation of General
Customat7 International Law, 69 Intl L Assn Rep Conf 712, 719-38 (2000) (stating that "[w]here a
rule of general customary international law exists, for any particular State to be bound by that rule
it is not necessary to prove... that State's consent to it or its belief in the rule's
obligatory... character" and that "if whilst a practice is developing into a rule of general law, a
State persistently and openly dissents from the rule, it will not be bound by it").
63 Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States at § 102 cmt k (cited in note 61)
(stating that "some rules of international law are recognized by the international community of
states as peremptory, permitting no derogation" and that "[t]hese rules prevail over and invalidate
international agreements... in conflict with them").
64 United Nations Charter, art 2, 4.
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The existence of such gaps and limitations in the international law of
partition and secession is not surprising. The key issues in each such event are
inherently political and differ greatly from case to case. Aside from these
practical difficulties, some existing states may further feel that creation of
secession-related rules will encourage secession movements, something they
particularly fear. Whatever the root cause, the best evidence that development of
law in this area is paralyzed is the failure of proposed treaties to enter into force.
The US has yet to sign the Treaty Convention, though adoption by other states
has been relatively widespread.6" Twenty-five years after the creation of the
Property Convention, it has yet to enter into force and only a few states have
ratified it.66 The Draft Articles remain just that.
Furthermore, the dramatic increase in the creation of new states since the
end of the Cold War has not led to significant developments in procedural or
substantive law. The breakup of Yugoslavia and the resulting Badinter
Commission rulings may have shed some light on the question of whether
and/or when there is a right to secede, but did little to resolve issues of how it
might legally take place.67 There appears to be no evidence that frequent
secession has led to creation of customary norms, as one might expect-with
the possible exception of a reinterpretation of uti possideis in a postcolonial
context.68 If the great increase in the rate of new-state creation over the past
twenty years has not generated a significant volume of relevant international law,
it seems unlikely that such law will be generated in the foreseeable future, at least
in the immutable and semi-immutable forms exemplified by the Treaty and
Property Conventions. It is therefore worthwhile to consider an alternate form
of legal rule-default rules-both as a fall-back position, given the political
difficulty of implementing broader rules, and as a possibly superior legal
response to the problems presented by partition or secession.
III. DEFAULT RULES IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
A. WHAT ARE DEFAULT RULES?
Although principles guiding the interpretation of agreements are probably as
old as law itself (or at least contract law), scholarship has relatively recently
65 Vienna Convention on State Succession in Respect of Treaties (1978), Multilateral Treaties
Deposited with the Secretary General.
66 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts
(1983), Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General.
67 See Photini Pazartzis, Secession and International Law: The European Dimension, in Kohen, ed, Secession
355, 365-67 (cited in note 31).
68 Ulipossidefis is discussed in detail above in Section II.C.3.b.
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analyzed such principles more deeply, giving them the name "default rules" and,
generally, praising their usefulness and influence.69 Scholars both inside and
outside the law-and-economics school have written extensively about default
rules.70 In private contract law, default rules exist to solve problems similar to
those faced by parties negotiating the creation of new states by partition or
secession. They do this by simultaneously resolving two issues.
First, due to limited resources and knowledge, parties are unable to create
"complete" contracts that provide for every contingency.71 In the absence of
default rules, parties might expend unnecessary resources attempting to create a
complete contract, or fail to even attempt agreement because they believe that
such an agreement is so costly as to be impractical. The consequence of such a
failure in private negotiations is an inability to reach an otherwise mutually
beneficial agreement. In negotiations concerning the possible creation of new
states, the stakes are even higher-not simply because more people or greater
interests are usually implicated, but because negotiation breakdown often leads
to armed conflict. In both contexts, therefore, default rules lower transaction
costs and increase the range of possible agreements-and therefore, in theory,
social welfare.
72
Second, default rules are easier to implement politically. In a sense, default
rules are the basic gap-fillers in contract law. 73 In some cases, when protection of
either parties to the contract or those outside the contract can be justified (on
paternalist grounds in the former case, and on grounds of uncompensated
externalities in the latter), immutable rules that bind the contracting parties
regardless of their desires, may be preferred.74 Where such externalities are
absent, default rules are the traditionally preferred means of filling gaps in
contracts, in part because they are less likely to be controversial. Parties that
oppose the default rule, or simply wish to keep their options open in future
situations, need not oppose its creation, as they would be compelled to do in the
case of an immutable rule and, likely, a semi-immutable rule with similar
69 See, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 Colum L
Rev 1416, 1428 (1989).
70 See id. See also Sunstein and Thaler, Nudge (cited in note 3) (praising changes in default rules as
mechanisms for overcoming costs associated with bounded rationality behavior). Note, however,
that as discussed in Section IB, Sunstein and Thaler use the term slightly differently than it is used
here.
71 See Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 Va L Rev 821,
821-22 (1992).
72 See id at 866; Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U Chi L Rev 351, 370 (1978).
73 Ian Ayres and Robert Germer, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 Yale LJ 87, 90 (1989).
74 Id at 89.
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substantive content. These parties can simply explicitly contract around the
default rule in the future. This may not even involve an additional cost, since
parties would be likely to expend resources negotiating any issue significant
enough to deviate from the default rule anyway.
In the context of secession and partition, where stakes are high and political
differences likely large, the relative ease with which default rules can be
implemented is particularly valuable. The difficulty of establishing international
law in this context illustrates this point vividly.7" Where it may be impossible or
extraordinarily difficult to implement immutable rules, default rules may remain
a viable option. This fact, combined with their ability to increase the range of
possible agreements, makes them very attractive in the context of the creation of
new states.
B. WHAT SHOULD THE CONTENT OF DEFAULT RULES BE?
Before discussing how default rules might be implemented internationally, it
is important to consider briefly the specific goals those rules should try to
achieve. Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, among others, have persuasively
argued that default rules should replicate the hypothetical agreement that the
contracting parties would have made, given perfect information and zero
negotiating costs.76 Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner further distinguish between
"tailored" default rules, or those that seek to provide contracting parties with
"precisely what they would have contracted for," and "untaiored" default rules,
or "single, off-the-rack standard[s] that in some sense represent[ ] what the
majority of contracting parties would want."77 The default rules proposed for
situations of new-state creation in the next section are untailored default rules.
78
The substance of these rules matters; rules should not be set randomly,
forcing parties to contract around them frequently. Untailored default rules
75 The limitations of current international law of new-state creation are discussed above in Section
IJ.C.
76 See Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 Colum L Rev at 1433 (cited in note 69). But see generally Ayres
and Gertner, 99 Yale L J 87 (cited in note 73) (arguing that not all default rules can or should take
this form). Penalty default rules are the most notable exception to this rule.
77 Ayres and Gertner, 99 Yale L J at 91 (cited in note 73). See also Charles J. Goetz and Robert E.
Scott, The Mitigation Princdple: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 Va L Rev 967, 971
(1983).
78 This is for two reasons. First, untailored rules are easier to create since they apply to all situations
and therefore need to be drawn up only once. Second, and more importantly, tailored rules are
difficult or impossible to implement internationally since there is no court with general
jurisdiction to interpret agreements. For a discussion of how inclusion of default rules in
individual agreements might provide a mechanism for introducing tailored default rules into the
context of creation of new states, see Section V.B.4 below.
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operate as penalty defaults for any parties that would prefer a rule set at a
different position.7 9 Untailored rules are therefore advantageous only when a
majority of potential contracting parties would favor the rule, which becomes
more likely when there are the fewer alternative contractual forms, and therefore
fewer possible default rule forms.s° While it may be difficult to determine which
default rules would be generally preferred by a majority of parties to potential
future negotiations over the creation of new states, it is at least likely that the
number of possible rules is relatively small. In fact, the choices are likely binary
in most cases. For example, in the absence of agreement to the contrary, should
preexisting internal borders determine the border of new states, or not? Even
for issues that are not so easily broken down into binary choices, it seems likely
that the number of possible choices is low. Further, implementation of
untailored default rules through treaties gives some assurance that they will
reflect the form favored by a majority of potential future contracting parties."
IV. A PARTIAL SOLUTION: DEFAULT RULES FOR THE
CREATION OF NEW STATES
A. THE VALUE OF DEFAULT RULES FOR THE CREATION OF
NEW STATES
In a world in which there are large gaps in the international law of new-state
creation, and in which the law that does exist is made up entirely of immutable
and semi-immutable rules, there are insufficient legal incentives to negotiate the
terms of partition or secession. This problem does not necessarily mean that
states will respond by supporting the creation of default rules. Even though the
costs of creating them are low, states might not perceive default rules to be
worth the benefits. What might a state that is not currently undergoing breakup
get out of the creation of default rules? There are at least two reasons to believe
that states will generally support default rules.
1. Secession and Partition Viewed from Behind the Veil
First, lack of information makes states more, not less, likely to consider legal
measures-including default rules-that are generally beneficial when new states
are created. If the expected benefits of default rules are analyzed by states ex
ante, it may be very difficult to determine over the long term which current
79 See Ayres and Gertmer, 99 Yale L J at 117 (cited in note 73).
80 Id at 116-17.
81 See Section IV.B.2 below for further discussion of the advantages of implementation by treaty.
Winter 2009
Ri'chardson
Chicago Journal of International Law
states will undergo partition or experience secession." To be sure, short-term
predictions can be made with some accuracy-Iraq is certainly more likely to be
partitioned than Japan,83 and parts of Indonesia more likely to attempt to secede
than parts of, say, Denmark.84 Nevertheless, international observers did not (and
likely could not have) predicted many of the secessions and partitions that
occurred in the postwar era very far in advance.85 Further, a great many states
have secessionist movements of varying levels of support.86 To the extent that
an agreement creating default rules would reduce the chances of conflict, many
states stand to benefit. More importantly, it will be very difficult for states to
determine whether they will benefit directly from this reduced risk. In this sense,
states considering the creation of default rules or any legal measure dealing with
new-state creation are operating behind a veil of ignorance. As Rawls originally
illustrated, rules made from such a position are more likely to generate
widespread benefits and less likely to be self-serving.87
2. Positive Externalities
Second, even states that are relatively confident that they will not undergo
partition or secession in the near future might support creation of default rules
because of the positive externalities they generate. For example, even if the US
feels there is no risk of secessionist movements in its territory,88 it might be very
interested in reducing the risk of conflict arising from secession or partition in
other states-particularly its neighbors, trading partners, and allies. America's
expenditures on state building, support for existing regimes, and, indeed, its
82 The largely unanticipated and abrupt end to the Cold War-and associated creation of new states
out of the former Czechoslovakia, USSR, and Yugoslavia-is perhaps the best example of this
difficulty.
83 For discussion of the likelihood of partition of Iraq, see text accompanying note 28.
84 See generally Duane Ruth-Heffelbower, Indonesia: Out of One, Many?, 26 Fletcher F World Aff 223
(Fall 2002) (discussing the threats to Indonesian national unity presented by ethnic and regional
movements). See also Li-Ann Thio, International Law and Secession in the Asia and Pacific Regions, in
Kohen, ed, Secession 297, 299 (cited in note 31) (discussing the "spate of ethno-religious separatist
movements" in Indonesia). There appears to be no evidence of Schleswig-Holsteiner irredentist
movements.
85 Again, dissolution of states after the end of the Cold War presents the best example of this
difficulty. Furthermore, the longer the time period in question, the likelier it is that division of any
given state will be considered.
86 See notes 17-19 and accompanying text for a few examples of recent or possible near-future
secession attempts. These movements exist across regions, levels of development, and degrees of
national stability.
87 See John Rawls, A Theory ofjustice 136-42 (Harvard 1971).
88 Such a belief might be unwise. Puerto Rico, for example, has an active independence movement.
See Abby Goodnough, Letterfrom San Juan: A Moribund Independence Movement Stirs Anew, NY Times
A25 (Nov 6, 2005).
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continuing investment in Iraq and Afghanistan are evidence of the lengths to
which the US is willing to go to maintain stability and prevent states from falling
apart or descending into conflict. If the creation of legal default rules can reduce
this risk, even in small part, the US and any state with similar interests in stability
would probably find the creation of such rules a wise investment of diplomatic
resources.
B. IMPLEMENTING RULES FOR NEW-STATE CREATION
Existing states have a variety of legal methods available for implementing
rules governing the creation of new states. This section analyzes those methods.
1. Implementation Through Customary International Law
Default rules could in theory be implemented through customary
international law, with associated advantages and disadvantages. Just as uti
possidefis has been established through state practice as an immutable or semi-
immutable rule,89 state practice and opiniojuris could establish a default rule in
another substantive area. Customary international law has problems and
limitations, however.9 ° Above all, and as the previous discussion of utipossidetis
illustrates, it can be difficult to determine what the rules of customary
international law are, and whether they will be enforced in practice. 9' If parties
negotiating the creation of a new state find it difficult to determine what any
default rules are, their value is limited. Further, customary international law takes
time to develop.9' Given the rate at which secession and partition events are
occurring, the benefits of default rules can be significant in the near future. We
may be at a unique period in history, experiencing an unprecedented rate of
new-state creation. 93 This trend clearly cannot last forever, unless one envisions a
future of city-states. The sooner the international community implements default
rules (or any international-law rules governing the creation of new states), the
more effective they will be.
89 See above in Section II.C.3.b.
90 See Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law 23-83 (Oxford 2005)
(identifying limitations of customary international law).
91 Utipossidetis is discussed in detail above in Section II.C.3.b.
92 See Sir Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts, eds, 1 Oppenheim's International Law 27 (Longman 9th ed
1992). But see Benjamin Langille, Note, It's Instant Custom: How the Bush Doctrine Became Law after
the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, 26 BC Intl & Comp L Rev 145, 149-53 (2003)
(discussing a possible "instant" method of creation of customary international law); The North Sea
Continental She/f Cases (W Ger v Den & Neth), 1969 ICJ 3, 74 (Feb 28, 1969) (recognizing that
customary international law can develop relatively quickly).
93 This trend is discussed above in Section II.A.
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2. Advantages and Limitations of Implementation by Treaty
Implementation by treaty addresses some of the limitations of customary
international law. Default rules are most effective when as many potential parties
as possible favor the content of the rule, 4 and treaties confirm that signatory
states support or at least accept the default rules contained within. The fact that
signatories to a treaty consent to its terms ensures that the signatories support
any default rules included in the treaty. Treaties can also become law much more
quickly than customary international law, since there is no need to wait for state
practice to develop."5 Treaties further provide clarity and settle expectations,
directly contributing to the positive externality value of default rules.
Treaties that implement default rules are not without significant problems of
their own, however. First, treaties leave out the interests of secessionist or
partitionist groups, which might differ from those of current states. There is
probably no way to include such groups in the negotiation of a treaty. Such
groups may not be identifiable or even exist yet, whatever their future goals.
They further have no traditional role in treaty negotiation (outside negotiations
to create the new states they advocate) and are unlikely to find a seat at the table
beside current states. To a great extent, this problem is addressed by the two
reasons, discussed above, for states to enter into a default rules agreement at
all-limited information and positive externalities. Since states do not know
whether they will face a threat of partition or secession, and want to benefit
from the externalities generated by reduction in the risk of conflict, they are less
likely to create default rules that systematically disfavor secessionist groups.
Further, a treaty that did so would be a waste of resources, as it would fail to
give secessionist groups any incentive to negotiate.
A deeper problem with implementation by treaty is best illustrated by the
failure of the Property Convention to acquire enough support to enter into
force. Despite the advantages mentioned and its clear list of rules, the Property
Convention has been left to wither, having been adopted by only a few states.
There are a variety of possible reasons for this failure to gain acceptance. It may
be that many states simply disliked the rules contained in the Property
Convention. More likely is that states fear that creation of rules will actually
increase the likelihood of secession, inspiring movements that would not
otherwise seek to create a new state. This interpretation of the Property
Convention arises from the fact that its rules are semi-immutable. As noted
above, they apply in all cases in which there is no agreement to the contrary,
94 See text accompanying note 80.
95 If treaty negotiations are sufficiently drawn out, however, this benefit could disappear. The
increased likelihood of political acceptability of default rules over other forms of rules, discussed
in Section IV.B.3 below, reduces this risk.
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including cases in which there is no agreement at all. A secession movement, if
successful, could rely on the Property Convention (if it were in force) to provide
international law support for efforts to divide property according to its terms.
Potential secession movements, if they knew in advance such legal rules existed
and could be applied against their former parent states in the event of success,
might be more likely to attempt secession. Fear of this result may be the source
of most states' opposition to the Property Convention and, presumably, to any
similar treaty.
3. Possible Treaty Forms
A treaty need not take the same form as the Property Convention, however,
and a treaty in a different form might be able to address the problems that have
prevented it from gaining support while retaining the general advantages of
implementation by treaty. At least four types of treaties, in fact, could provide
rules for the creation of new states. From strongest to weakest, those forms are
as follows:
a) Treaty with immutable rules. The strongest treaty supplying rules for new-
state creation would create immutable rules and would force all parent and
successor states to follow those rules as a matter of international law. Even
agreement of both parties to alternative terms would be insufficient to overcome
this legal obligation. In some circumstances, most notably where third parties are
affected, such rules may be the preferred option.96 This is probably the reason
for the Treaty Convention's imposition of immutable rules. 9 7 Immutable rules
are not a good general solution, though. Default rules have significant
advantages over immutable rules in reducing negotiation costs and widening the
scope of possible agreement. 98 Individual parties involved in creation of a new
state are better placed to determine the substantive details of that creation, at
least so long as their decisions do not impose negative externalities on other
states. It also seems unlikely that sets of immutable rules will find sufficient
international support to be implemented-if such support existed, immutable-
rules treaties would already exist. In reality, only the Treaty Convention has been
implemented, and treaty succession may be the situation presenting the strongest
case for immutable rules.99 If the Treaty Convention can attract only twenty-one
96 See Ayres and Gertner, 99 Yale L J at 88 (cited in note 73) (noting that immutable rules are
generally preferred in cases where agreed terms impose uncompensated externalities on third
parties).
97 See Section II.C.1 above for a discussion of the Treaty Convention. See also Section IV.C.I.c
below for a discussion of the form of rules most appropriate to the treaty context.
98 See Section III.A above for a discussion of the general advantages of default rules.
99 See Section III.A above.
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ratifying states parties,'0° the existence of support for immutable-rules treaties in
other substantive areas is implausible in the foreseeable future.
b) Treaty with semi-immutable rules. A treaty could also create semi-
immutable rules-again, rules that apply in all cases except those where parties
affirmatively agree to other terms. As discussed above, the Property Convention
takes this form."' The great advantage of such a treaty is that its rules have great
influence and applicability (surpassed only by immutable rules), presumably
leading to the greatest benefits both in terms of easier negotiations for the
parties themselves and settled expectations for the international community as a
whole. The disadvantage of such a treaty is that it may not be politically feasible,
possibly, as discussed in Section IV.B.2 above, because states believe that
enactment would increase incentives to secede. The Property Convention vividly
illustrates this problem.
There is certainly value in rules that apply in cases of resisted secession or
partition where no agreement exists. Indeed, these cases are arguably in
desperate need of legal rules to help prevent conflict. Nevertheless, the political
reality that such rules have been impossible to implement cannot be ignored. It
is possible, though unlikely, that in the future a different political consensus will
emerge among states that the benefits of semi-immutable rules exceed their
costs. If this were to occur, there is no apparent reason to oppose their
implementation, and, in fact, they should be welcomed. Taking current political
realities as a given, however, advocating the adoption of new semi-immutable-
rules treaties is not likely to be fruitful.
c) Treaty with true default rules. A treaty might provide a set of default rules
and provide that as a matter of international law, those rules would govern
interpretation of agreements creating new states. Note, however, that such rules
would only govern interpretation of agreements-at a minimum, an agreement
on the basic question of whether a new state will be created. Such rules in
international law would be the closest analog to default rules in private contract
law. This kind of default-rules treaty would have all the advantages previously
discussed:'0 2 providing a starting point for negotiations, reducing negotiating
costs, and reducing the risks of breakdown. It would have no influence over
secessions or partitions where the parties never reach or never seek agreement,
reducing fears some states may have that it would create incentives for secession.
Parent states would retain control over whether the default rules in the treaty
will apply, since they can always refuse to agree to secession.
100 Vienna Convention on State Succession in Respect of Treaties (1978), Multilateral Treaties
Deposited with the Secretary General.
101 See Section J1.C.2 above for a detailed discussion of the Property Convention.
102 See Section I.A above for a discussion of the general advantages of default rules.
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d) ' 3oileoplate" treay. The weakest possible agreement would create a list
of default rules that have no legal force of their own, but could be adopted into
an agreement creating a new state, then later used to interpret that agreement or
to fill gaps. In a sense, such an agreement would simplify negotiations by
providing "boilerplate" or "best-practices" text and principles which parties
could use without having to create them from scratch. Parties would be free to
adopt some or all of the listed rules, or to modify them as they see fit. An
agreement creating such principles would be a treaty in only the loosest sense,
since it would impose no obligations or even any rules at all. A boilerplate
"treaty" might therefore be better understood as a generally accepted set of
building blocks for implementation in individual agreements. 103 States parties do
not even need to create it; the International Law Commission or any similar
body could create such rules for adoption into future agreements. In fact, the
Commission has developed "model rules" for other substantive issues that
function in essentially the same way as a boilerplate agreement. 04 To the extent
that the principles embodied in the set of rules would have legal force, that force
would arise not from an agreement creating the rules, but from the inclusion of
the rules in the agreement between the parent and successor state (or portions of
a partitioning state) itself.
4. Implementation in Individual Agreements
Even if the international community were unable to agree on the creation of
default rules, states could implement them in limited fashion through bilateral
agreements. Implementation in this manner would allow the use of "tailored"
default rules. Such tailored rules in private contract law are made by a court that
constructs a hypothetical ex ante bargain between the parties, and then creates a
default rule that, as much as possible, accurately reflects that bargain. °5 Since
there is often no judicial review of international agreements, and no method
comparable to civil suit for one party to unilaterally seek such review, tailored
default rules are generally unavailable internationally. If parties commit
interpretation of an agreement creating a new state to international court or
arbitral review in advance, however, the reviewing body could create tailored
103 See Section IV.B.4 below for a discussion of implementation of default rules in individual
agreements.
104 See generally International Law Commission, Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure with a General
Commentay, 2 YB Intl L Commun 83 (1958).
105 See Ayres and Germer, 99 Yale LJ at 91-92 (cited in note 73).
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rules in the same way that a national court considering a private contract dispute
might.1
06
In its most extreme and unlikely form, parties might throw the entire process
onto a court or other international body for resolution. Even if this scenario is
unrealistic, a more modest approach seems feasible. Parties could negotiate all
important and foreseeable issues, and then insert a clause into the agreement
providing explicitly that gaps will be filled by a chosen body along tailored-
default-rule lines. Parties could submit interpretation of the agreement in
advance to the ICJ, to regional courts, or to any other mutually agreeable body.
There is ICJ precedent for interpretation of agreements to create new states,107
and there is no apparent reason why the court could not interpret such
agreements based on default rules specified within them. Such a submission
would not require modification of the ICJ Statute, which limits the right to
appear before the court to states. 08 Even though at least one of the parties
making the agreement would not yet be a state, by the time a later dispute
requiring interpretation of the agreement were to arise, all parties would be states
and therefore eligible to be a party to an ICJ case.
Negotiation of default rules in such agreements, however, probably offers
only small benefits, if any, over negotiating the more detailed terms default rules
seek to avoid. Precommitment by some or all states to general rules governing
the creation of new states would have significant advantages in terms of
administrability and settled expectations, as well as lowered negotiation costs.
5. Implementation by a Default Rules Treaty Is Most Likely
to Succeed
As the preceding discussion makes clear, states are most likely to accept
implementation of default rules by treaty, as this form provides significant
benefits to parties negotiating an agreement to create a new state while
remaining politically palatable. Immutable rules, while useful to some extent in
the treaty-succession context, are both generally less efficient than default rules
and almost surely politically unacceptable. Semi-immutable-rules treaties,
whatever their advantages, face similar political problems, as the Property
Convention shows. Boilerplate agreements may have some value-they are
probably an improvement over the current state of affairs, in that they provide at
106 The ICJ has taken cases that deal with interpretation of agreements creating new states, with the
Burkina Faso-Mali case as perhaps the best example. See generally Case Concerning the Frontier
Dipute (Burkina Faso v Mali), 1986 ICJ Lexis 3.
107 See, for example, id.
108 Statute of the International Court of Justice (June 26, 1945), art 34 1, 59 Stat 1031, 1059.
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least some guidance and a starting point for negotiations-but their influence is
likely to be limited, not least because they lack any force of law on their own.
Default rules, however, grant benefits where they are most needed or at least
most useful--cases where broad agreement is possible but difficulties arise in
specific terms. At the same time, such rules provide parties, including the future
parent states that today must agree on a treaty, with a veto over their
applicability which can be exercised simply by refusing to make any agreement
on secession or partition at all. They therefore avoid the problems that seem to
have led states to reject semi-immutable-rules treaties like the Property
Convention.
C. POSSIBLE DEFAULT RULES FOR THE CREATION OF
NEW STATES
Ultimately, answering the question of whether default rules in international
law would make a positive contribution to the process of creating new states
depends on what those rules are. While determining a complete structure of
such rules is beyond the scope of this Comment, the following section considers
a few modest proposals for specific rules.
1. Recasting Law as Default Rules
Generally, it is possible to divide issues that arise regarding the creation of
new states into three categories. In one category are rights, obligations, and
property whose distribution between a parent and successor state (or between
the successors of a partitioned state) affects only those parties; territory and state
property are the best examples. In another category are things whose
distribution between the parties has significant effects on other states; that is,
externalities. The best examples of these are probably state debts and treaties
involving other states. There is also an immediate category of things whose
distribution primarily affects the immediate parties, but which might impose
negative externalities on other states in extreme circumstances. For example,
nationality of citizens is generally a matter affecting only the parties creating a
new state, but if former citizens were to become stateless refugees, this would
impact other states.
Default rules could be a valuable legal tool in all three categories, though to
varying degrees. Default rules are most applicable to those issues in the first
category. In the absence of externalities, little reason exists to impose immutable
or semi-immutable rules. For those issues in the second category, immutable or
semi-immutable rules may be preferable-though if such rules prove politically
impossible to create, default rules are better than no law at all. It may also be
possible to look carefully at cases where there generally appear to be externalities
involved and to identify areas within them where a prevailing immutable or
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semi-immutable rule could be replaced with a default rule without risking
damage to third parties. Finally, the last, overlapping category presents a weak
case for immutable or semi-immutable rules. It is highly likely that creation of
such rules will be politically difficult in these areas, and that default rules will be
a suboptimal but feasible fallback position.
The sections that follow detail how this framework could be applied to three
substantive areas: territory, property, and treaties.
a) Territory. The role of utipossidetis in international law should be clarified
and possibly recast entirely as a default rule. The principle putatively governs the
allocation of territory to newly created states, 109 but its implications are not clear
in practice-it may function as an immutable or semi-immutable rule."0 If it
operates as an immutable rule and, to a lesser extent, if it is a semi-immutable
rule, uti possidetis might not give sufficient incentives to parties to negotiate a
mutually agreeable secession or partition. As the example of Kosovo illustrates, a
secessionist movement to whose advantage utipossidelis works has relatively little
incentive to negotiate with its parent over territory."
With that said, the advantages of a settled semi-immutable utipossidetis rule
should not be discounted. Such a rule would provide all the benefits of
administrability and settled expectations associated with such rules, benefits that
seem particularly valuable when the issue at hand is so likely to engender
conflict. Indeed, if utipossidetis currently operates as a semi-immutable rule, the
best course of action would almost certainly be to leave it alone.
Since the rule is ambiguous, however, it would be beneficial to clarify or to
codify it. Clarifying or codifying a rule as semi-immutable might be politically
difficult, however. If so, it should at least be clarified as a default rule.
Specifically, the rule should be that new states created by agreement with the
former parent (or other successor states in the case of a partition) have borders
determined under international law by preexisting internal administrative
boundaries, unless the parties agree otherwise.
b) Propery. The Property Convention has done little to resolve issues of
state succession with respect to property. First, as discussed above, it is not in
force. This has not prevented parties from making agreements on succession of
state property in recent cases of partition or secession, for example in
Czechoslovakia, the USSR, and even Yugoslavia." 2 Still, such agreements might
have been easier had the Property Convention or some other codification of
109 See Section II.C.3.b above for a detailed discussion of utipossidetis.
110 See text accompanying notes 54-59.
M See Section iI.B above for a discussion of the role of ulipossidetis in the Kosovar secession.
112 See Zimmermann, Secession and the Law of State Succession at 22-23 (cited in note 40).
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rules for succession of property been in force. Further, agreement on issues
related to division of property in future secessions or partitions might be more
difficult. 3 Second, the semi-immutable rules in the Property Convention
provide insufficient incentives to seek agreement on these issues.
In short, the international community should discard the Property
Convention as it stands, and its semi-immutable provisions should be recast as
default rules, at least with respect to those rules that deal with internal allocation
of property as opposed to allocation of responsibility for external debts. The
substance of the provisions for allocation of property in the current Property
Convention can and probably should be left as they are. These provisions are
sensible and at least some number of states negotiated them, even if they were
later unable to ratify the agreement as a whole. The necessary change in the
Property Convention is not in the substance of these provisions, but in the
scope of the agreement itself. It should be redrafted in default-rule terms, so that
it applies only to situations in which a basic agreement on the creation of a new
state has been made; unless the parties to such an agreement specify otherwise,
the convention's provisions would apply. Absent such a basic agreement, the
convention would have no effect.
c) Treay Obligations. Succession of treaty obligations is perhaps the most
difficult area of law for the creation of default rules. The reason is simple-
immutable rules are favored when agreements impose externalities on parties
outside the agreement. 14 Since treaties involve an interconnecting web of mutual
obligations between parties, when one party (the parent state in the case of
secession or disintegrating state in the case of partition) alters the obligations,
that action affects all other parties as well. Take, for example, an arms-control
treaty. Imagine that State A and State B agree to limit themselves to a fixed
number of nuclear warheads. If State B peacefully divides, creating new State C,
allowing B and C to agree to free C from its obligations under the treaty and to
maintain an unlimited nuclear arsenal would clearly impact the interests and
rights of A under the treaty. Similar externalities arise in many other types of
treaties, such as those limiting pollution, governing external boundaries, and the
like. In fact, the majority of treaties probably fall into this category.
Not all treaties necessarily impose such externalities if their obligations apply
differently to newly created states, however. Take, for example, a treaty that
involves some form of payment-such as war reparations or a purchase of
military equipment. In the above scenario, new State C need not be bound by
the treaty to pay any amount, pro-rated by population, GDP, or otherwise. The
113 For example, agreement on division of oil resources in a prospective partition of Iraq, discussed
above in Section II.B, would likely be particularly difficult.
114 See Ayres and Germer, 99 Yale LJ at 88-89 (cited in note 73).
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parties may prevent damage to the interests of A, since B and C could choose
any of a variety of agreements with respect to the division of obligations under
the treaty, so long as the total payment to A is unchanged. Treaty obligations
might therefore become an item for negotiation in the secession process,
increasing the range of agreement. Where treaty obligations are in this sense
divisible, the externality argument for an immutable rule no longer applies. Even
pollution or arms-control treaties might be conceptualized in this way: if a treaty
restricts a parent state to a given level of emissions or given quantity of weapons,
and that state divides, no externality is imposed so long as the total level of
emissions or quantity of weapons over the original territory does not change.
In such cases, there is a window for the operation of default rules with
respect to succession of treaty obligations. The Treaty Convention should be
recast to reflect this window, with its basic principle of universal succession of
treaty obligation restated as a default rule. Deviation from this rule would be
possible by agreement of the immediate parties to the secession or partition, so
long as the interests of other parties to the treaty were not affected or all other
parties also agreed to the reallocation of rights or responsibilities under the
treaty.
Another solution might be to adopt default succession rules in individual
treaties. Where a treaty imposes externalities by deviating from the general rule
of succession, no modification is necessary, since the immutable rule in the
Treaty Convention guarantees succession of obligations. Where such
externalities are unlikely, or can be evaded by reallocation of obligations among
the new states, provisions in the treaty should recast the Treaty Convention's
immutable rule as a default rule.
2. Setting Default Rules in Practice
Ultimately, states will determine the substantive content of such rules, either
by custom or by the treaties they create. Generally, the content of the rules will
be such that they are considered favorable or at least not unfavorable to the
greatest number of states possible, operating as penalty defaults to the smallest
number possible. It is further likely that states will package the rules in groups,
as was done with the immutable and semi-immutable rules in the Treaty and
Property Conventions, rather than attempt to set them individually. Grouping
proposed rules in this way allows implementation of the entire set of rules,
which are likely beneficial as a whole to all states, without obstruction of
individual rules by states that may disfavor them.
It is likely that default rules for new-state creation will be similar in substance
if not in form to those rules that have already been drafted, such as the Property
Convention, but that unlike those rules they will actually enter into force and be
adopted by significant numbers of states. It is certainly possible, however, that
states will decide to set default rules at a different point than existing immutable
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and semi-immutable rules. It is also possible that the default-rule form will make
agreement on rules for new-state creation possible in areas that have not yet
been considered, addressing the significant gaps in the law governing the
creation of new states. To take one minor issue, what would the rules be for
allocation of top-level domain names in the event of secession or partition? For
example, if Belgium were to split, which state would get rights to the *.be
domain?11 A rule governing this issue, along with a web of rules governing
other substantive issues, would, in a small way, make general agreement on
creation of a new state more likely.
D. LIMITATIONS OF DEFAULT RULES
While default rules for partition and secession can have a powerful positive
influence, they are not a panacea for preventing all secessionist conflict. On the
contrary, their benefits are incremental and limited to situations in which there is
some underlying possibility of agreement. Furthermore, there are some
arguments that default rules would have relatively little impact or might even be
counterproductive. This section will consider and attempt to refute a few of
these arguments before briefly addressing issues for further study.
1. Is Law Irrelevant in Cases of Partition or Secession?
One criticism of the significance of default rules might be that they would
have little, if any, effect on the underlying political issues that ultimately
determine whether and in what form secession or partition will take place. In
other words, the critic might say, it does not matter whether there is "too little"
or "too much" law in this area-the parties will agree on the terms of secession
or, more likely, fail to agree, regardless of the background law." 6
Secession and partition are and will always remain fundamentally political
issues, in which factors other than background law are likely to play the pivotal
role. Default rules do a better job of reflecting and adapting to this reality than
do immutable or semi-immutable rules, however. If political issues completely
trump the law of secession and partition, immutable rules are meaningless. To
the extent that marginal cases do exist, in which agreement is possible but only if
negotiation costs are minimized, default rules can make a difference. Before
agreements are made, there may be some class of situations, however small, for
115 At least one scholar has written on states' possible intellectual property interests in their top-level
domains. See generally A. Michael Froomkin, When We Say U5r m We Mean It, 41 Hous L Rev
839 (2004).
116 This argument is related to the general proposition that international law has no role to play in
this process-that the creation of new states is a factual, not legal, issue. See Crawford, The
Creation of States at 4 (cited in note 4).
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which agreement is possible with default rules but impossible without them.
After agreements are made, default rules provide a ready means of interpretation
with benefits that extend into the future.
A strong argument can be made that the benefits of default rules, or any
international law rules in cases of partition or secession, are small. This does not
mean that these benefits are zero. Since the costs of creating new default rules,
which impose no new obligations, are extremely low, and the costs of conflict so
high, even small marginal benefits make them a good investment.
2. Would Default Rules Fail to Resolve Underlying Questions
of Legality?
Some might claim that the international law of partition and secession is in
fact too weak, and that default rules do nothing to correct this weakness. Judging
from the volume of scholarly work, the question of whether and when
international law permits secession is of great interest, and many scholars would
certainly like international law to provide a clear answer."1 Default rules do not
serve this function-in fact, they say nothing at all about the legality of any given
new state's creation.
This is not a problem so much as an intentional limitation. Default rules are
not intended to answer the question of legality, but rather to provide a
framework for negotiation and interpretation of agreements. International law
may not be able to provide a meaningful answer to the question of legality of
secession, at least not in a recognizable nation-state system. Even if it can,
default rules are not likely to be part of that answer. This is a virtue of default
rules, though, rather than a flaw. The difficulty of resolving the basic legality
issue has largely paralyzed the development of the international law of partition
or secession. By addressing practical problems with default rules, it may be
possible to build a consensus for developing useful law while this issue remains
unresolved. Both supporters of expansive rights of remedial secession and those
of absolute territorial integrity of existing states can support new, clear default
rules. Parties can avoid them, after all, simply by agreeing to an alternative--or
by refusing to agree to secession or partition at all.
3. Would Default Rules Be Politically Impossible to Create?
With some states-China" 8 and Russia1 9 in particular-greatly concerned
about any encouragement of secessionist groups and with great disagreement
117 See note 33 above (listing a number of works focusing on right to secession and self-
determination issues).
118 See Thio, International Law and Secession at 323 (cited in note 84) (discussing "China's political
resolve and military capacity to suppress separatist movements").
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among states and scholars about the legality of secession, a critic might argue
that creation of any law, even default rules, in this area will be politically
impossible or at least costly. Such a critic might point, in particular, to the failure
of the Property Convention to enter into force. It is certainly true that like any
agreement concerning secession, agreements establishing default rules will be
politically controversial.
The best defense is that default rules will be much easier to implement than
immutable or even semi-immutable rules. If international agreements on the law
of partition and secession can be stripped down to include only or primarily
default rules, they are much more likely to be widely adopted than other
agreements, particularly those containing immutable rules or purporting to
govern rights of secession. Politically, default rules should be (accurately)
presented as measures to increase stability and reduce the chances of conflict,
not measures designed to facilitate secession.
4. Might Default Rules Sometimes Decrease the Likelihood
of Agreement?
It is possible in some cases that a default rule considered unfavorable by one
party might actually discourage negotiation and agreement. A party facing such a
rule might be willing to forgo all default rules and refuse to enter into any
agreement at all, relying on the strength of its position and eventual international
acceptance of the de facto situation to achieve its aims."2
The possibility of this event occurring cannot be ignored, but it can be
limited. First, states creating default rules by treaty should not create rules that
systematically or severely disadvantage secessionist groups. Such rules are
wasteful: facing them, secessionist groups will simply secede without agreement.
To the greatest extent possible, default rules should be calibrated ex ante to
provide the greatest perceived benefit to the greatest number of potential
parties. As Easterbrook and Fischel argue, they should be set at the point at
which parties, taken in the aggregate, are most likely to agree, given unlimited
time and resources.'21 Any deviation from this goal reduces the rules'
effectiveness. Second, the more default rules that are created, the less likely it is
that this problem will discourage negotiation. Even if a party views one or more
rules as disadvantageous, it will be less willing to abandon negotiations and "go
119 See Pazartzis, Secession and International Law at 368-70 (cited in note 67) (discussing Russian
military campaigns to block Chechen secession).
120 This argument is rooted in the insight that default rules set at a point unfavorable to a given party
operate as penalty default rules from the point of view of that party. The party is forced either to
contract around the rule, or to forgo agreement entirely to avoid it. See Ayres and Gertner, 99
Yale LJ at 117 (cited in note 73).
121 See Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 Colum L Rev at 1433 (cited in note 69).
Winter 2009
Ri'chardson
Chicago Journal of Internalional Law
it alone" if, in doing so, it would also sacrifice the benefits of a web of other
rules. The more extensive and balanced the architecture of default rules
governing new-state creation, the more incentives all parties have to operate
within it, rather than outside it.
E. ISSUES FOR FURTHER STUDY
Additional study can surely be done in this area. In particular, proposals for
specific default rules might be made in areas not considered here. Alternatives or
more detailed proposals for rules in the areas that have been addressed are also
undoubtedly needed.
Another potentially interesting issue not addressed in this Comment is the
possible value of penalty-default rules in the international law of partition and
secession. Penalty defaults are intended to give at least one party an incentive to
make an explicit agreement, rather than relying on the default rule. 2 2 Cases in
the international context might exist in which an explicit agreement, and the
settled expectations it provides, would be so valuable that it is worth instituting a
penalty default at the cost of increased likelihood of negotiation breakdown.
V. CONCLUSION
Creating and implementing default rules in international law for partition
and secession has significant potential to reduce the risk of conflict at relatively
low cost. Just as default rules in private contract or divorce law reduce the
potential for high litigation costs, negotiation breakdown, and conflict, so too
would default rules for "international divorce." Furthermore, existing
agreements such as the Property Convention and Treaty Convention supply
basic substantive rules. At a minimum, therefore, all that is necessary in these
spheres is a change in the form these rules take.
Implementing default rules for the creation of new states is therefore an
incremental, not revolutionary, change. Semi-immutable rules including those in
the Property Convention and, possibly, the customary principle of utipossidetis,
already enable parties to the creation of new states to shift their content by
agreement. Recasting these and other rules in default-rule form is a small legal
change, but is likely to have significant results in practice. Above all, default rules
are much more likely than immutable and semi-immutable rules to be politically
acceptable to existing states.
Increased prevalence of default rules is likely palatable to both critics and
ardent supporters of the role of international law. Critics should see default rules
as a modest, minimalist intervention into political issues that is much more likely
122 Barnett, 78 Va L Rev at 887 (cited in note 71).
Vol. 9 No. 2
Breaking Up Doesn't Have To Be So Hard
to be effective and to preserve respect for international law than the sweeping
yet often ineffectual measures they often criticize. Proponents of an increased
role for international law may see default rules as a way to advance the reach of
law into an area-secession and partition-where it has previously been weak or
absent, and hopefully achieve the many benefits they associate with the rule of
(international) law. This is not to imply that the proposal is above criticism-
Section IV.D notes some criticisms, and there may be others. Despite these
criticisms, implementation of default rules for partition and secession is both
realistic and beneficial. Current international law is not doing the job because
international politics is, understandably, paralyzing its development.
At the same time, the increase in the rate of new state creation has been so
dramatic, and the costs of conflict so high, that even an incremental reduction in
the risk of conflict is worth significant investment in measures to prevent it. The
investment involved in the creation of default rules is low. States are much more
likely to accept default rules than other, stronger forms of legal rules. Even if
one is skeptical of the size of the benefits, the investment is a good one. Default
rules for the creation of new states are, in a sense, soft law for hard times. This
may seem counterintuitive, but it is the right solution-or at least a small part of
one-to a critical international problem.
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